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Abstract. I examine the origins of ordinary racial thinking. In doing so, I argue against the thesis that 
it is the byproduct of a unique module (e.g. a folk-biology module). Instead, I defend a pluralistic 
thesis according to which different forms of racial thinking are driven by distinct mechanisms, each 
with their own etiology. I begin with the belief that visible features are diagnostic of race. I argue that 
the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have an important, albeit delimited, role to play in 
sustaining this belief. I then argue that essentialist beliefs about race are driven by some of the 
mechanisms responsible for “entitativity perception”: the tendency to perceive some aggregates of 
people as more genuine groups than others. Finally, I argue that coalitional thinking about race is 
driven by a distinctive form of entitativity perception. However, I suggest that more data is needed to 
determine the prevalence of this form of racial thinking.          
1 Introduction     
How and why do we categorize people according to race? Given that racial categorization is 
automatic (see Ito & Tomelleri, 2017) and relatively widespread, one might be tempted to posit a 
module that was adapted for encoding race. However, ancestral hunter gatherers moved around 
on foot, meaning that encounters between the bearers of distinct racial markers were probably 
rare. It is therefore unlikely that we possess a module that was selected for categorizing others 
according to race (Cosmides et al., 2003). This leaves us with two main hypotheses.       
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According to one of these hypotheses, racial concepts are cultural inventions (e.g., see 
Hochman, 2013, 2019; Jackson, 2017; Smedley & Smedley, 2005, 19). According to the other 
main hypothesis—popular among evolutionary psychologists—racial categorization is the 
byproduct of a module that was adapted for other purposes (Atran, 1990, 2001; Cosmides et al., 
2003; Gil-White, 2001; Hirschfeld 1996; Pietraszewski et al., 2014, 2015). Are the evolutionary 
psychologists on the right track, or, is racial thinking a purely cultural invention?   
In what follows, I argue that ordinary racial thinking is not the byproduct of a single module, 
such as a folk-biology module. Instead, I defend a pluralistic thesis according to which different 
ways of thinking about race are driven by distinct mechanisms, each with their own etiology. 
Moreover, I argue that by invoking these mechanisms, we can explain some of the key ways in 
which racial thinking varies both within and across cultures.    
In section 2, I examine the folk belief that races are groups of humans distinguished, in part, 
by visible features. I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition have an 
important role to play in sustaining this belief. In section 3, I examine the folk belief that race is 
an inherited, biological, trait. In doing so, I argue against the view—held by a number of 
evolutionary psychologists—that both essentialist and inheritance beliefs about race are 
byproducts of the same module (e.g. a folk-biology module). In section 4, I defend the view that 
essentialist thinking about race is produced by some of the mechanisms responsible for what 
social psychologists call “entitativity perception”: the tendency to perceive some aggregates of 
people as more genuine groups than others. More specifically, I distinguish between two 
varieties of entitativity perception: “categorical” and “dynamical.” I argue that the categorical 
entitativity perception drives essentialist thinking about race, whereas, dynamical entitativity 
perception drives the tendency to think of racial groups as coalitions.    
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I conclude by discussing potential ways in which this pluralistic approach will advance our 
understanding of racial prejudice, racial stereotyping, and the ethics of racial categorization.      
2 Face recognition and the visual markers of race   
One belief that is central to folk thinking about race is that the members of different racial groups 
are distinguished by bodily features, such as skin color and facial physiognomy (see Glasgow, 
2009, 69, 119; Hardimon, 2003; Hirschfeld, 1996, 155). The centrality of this belief is reflected 
in the fact that some individuals are seen as more typical-looking for a given racial group than 
others (Maddox, 2004, p. 383). For example, Black men are stereotypically thought to have 
“dark skin tone, broad noses, full lips, and tightly curled hair” (Maddox & Perry, 2018, p. 58). 
Research has also shown that when a member of a racial group is seen as highly typical for that 
group, they are subject to more prejudice and stereotyping than other members. Maddox calls 
this racial phenotypicality bias (Maddox, 2004; see also Maddox & Perry, 2018).    
The consensus among biologists and race scholars is that there is no non-arbitrary way to sort 
people according to the visible markers of race (e.g., see Zack, 2002, p. 43). Nonetheless, the 
belief that visible features are diagnostic of race is still widespread among the folk. Where does 
this belief come from? In what follows, I argue that the mechanisms responsible for face 
recognition have a key role to play.  
2.1 Face-space and the other-race effect 
Face recognition is one of the most widely studied capacities in cognitive science. One especially 
robust finding is that people tend not to recognize the faces of other-race individuals as well as 
the faces of own-race individuals. This is widely referred to as “the other-race effect” (Meissner 
& Brigham, 2001).  
 4 
There are various theories about what drives the other-race effect. According to one 
influential approach, people tend not to individuate other-race faces due to a lack of motivation. 
Evidence for this approach comes from studies in which increasing people’s motivation to 
individuate other-race faces dampens the other-race effect; as well as studies in which decreasing 
their motivation enhances it (see Young et al., 2012). 
Motivational accounts have an important role to play in explaining various instances of the 
other-race effect; however, they do not explain how and why racial markers are processed as 
outgroup cues in the first place (I offer some explanations below in section 4).   
Similarly, consider Levin’s influential view according to which other-race faces are 
represented as having a “race-specifying feature,” whereas, own-race faces are not (Levin, 2000). 
According to Levin, the encoding of this race-specifying feature means that relative to own-race 
faces, other-race faces are costly to process: as a result, fewer resources are directed towards 
individuating them. Like proponents of the motivational account, Levin does not specify how 
and why other-race faces are processed in terms of “race-specifying features.”     
 How then do face-processing mechanisms become attuned to racial markers? Fortunately, a 
unifying model has emerged. Based on the pioneering work of Valentine (1991), it is now widely 
thought that faces are represented as points in a multi-dimensional face-space. The dimensions of 
face-space are still not fully understood; however, they are thought to represent attributes such as 
face shape; skin color; and so on. Through experience, face-space is constructed and updated in a 
way that optimizes recognition (Valentine et al., 2016, p. 1999). Its dimensions thereby come to 
reflect the facial features that one typically encounters, the origin being occupied by the average 
face, which is close to the central tendency on all dimensions. If one’s diet of faces is largely 
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restricted to one’s own racial group, the dimensions of face-space become optimized for 
recognizing own-race faces, but not other-race faces.  
Developmental studies provide compelling support for the face-space model. By about 9 
months of age, infants raised in primarily monoracial environments start to exhibit the other-race 
effect (see Kelly et al., 2007). Importantly, this developmental trajectory appears to be cross-
culturally robust (Kelly et al., 2007; Kobayashi et al., 2016; Suhrke et al., 2014; Tham et al., 
2017). There is also strong evidence that the mechanisms driving it are phylogenetically ancient. 
For example, Sugita (2008) tested infant Japanese macaques on their ability to recognize either 
human or macaque faces. Those macaques that had only been exposed to human faces had 
difficulty distinguishing between macaque faces; whereas, those that had only been exposed to 
macaque faces had difficulty distinguishing between human faces. Similar effects have been 
found in other primates, including New World monkeys, Old World monkeys, and great apes 
(see Dufour, Pascalis, & Petit, 2006; Pascalis & Bachevalier, 1998).    
 There is thus strong evidence for a phylogenetically ancient face-processing mechanism that 
is sensitive to the visual markers of race. This mechanism causes those raised in primarily 
monoracial settings to perceptually discriminate between own- and other-race individuals. 
Importantly, though, distinguishing between own- and other-race individuals is not the function 
of this mechanism: its function is to optimize face recognition. This goes some way towards 
explaining why the visible markers of race become salient to children. However, it does not fully 
explain how and why children acquire representations of race-specific categories, such as Black, 
White, and Asian. Of course, many children will acquire race-specific concepts from those who 
already possess them, such as their parents. But given that we are trying to unearth the origins of 
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racial thinking, this is obviously not a satisfying explanation: it does not tell us how these other 
individuals acquired the relevant concepts.  
2.2 The recognition-byproduct hypothesis     
Some theorists have suggested that race-specific categorization is, in fact, a byproduct of face 
recognition (see Kramer et al., 2017). To see why this might be the case, consider the fact that 
when it comes to recognizing others, those features that are relatively invariant across viewing 
conditions serve as the most reliable cues: examples include sex; age; height; and those visible 
features that are commonly thought to indicate one’s race. In contrast, those features that are 
relatively fleeting do not serve as reliable cues: examples include facial expressions of emotion, 
the orientation of one’s arms, and so on. This is reflected in witness testimony, as well as police 
descriptions of wanted suspects, which tend to describe individuals in terms of the invariant 
features listed above.1    
This observation about the role that invariant cues play in recognizing other individuals 
suggests a simple hypothesis: face-processing mechanisms sort people according to the visual 
markers of race because this optimizes recognition. Call this “the recognition-byproduct 
hypothesis.”    
The recognition-byproduct hypothesis is supported by computer simulations of face 
recognition (see Balas, 2012; Dahl et al., 2016; Kramer et al., 2017; O’Toole et al., 1991). For 
example, Kramer and colleagues (2017) trained a model to recognize faces across a range of 
viewing conditions. Their model utilized Linear Discriminant Analysis, which is widely used in 
face classification systems because it is an efficient way of establishing which features best 
 
1 For example, see https://home.chicagopolice.org/about/contact-us/how-to-describe-a-suspect/ 
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describe a class of stimuli (e.g. different images of the same face), thereby discriminating it from 
members of other classes (e.g. images of other faces).   
Initially, Kramer and colleagues (2017) trained their model on 20 faces. Once the model had 
optimized its ability to recognize these faces (achieving 98% accuracy on novel images of them), 
new faces were fed into it. What Kramer and colleagues found is that the model immediately 
started grouping novel faces according to both race and sex. What’s more, it did so very 
“accurately,” correctly categorizing 91% of new faces according to race.2  
According to Kramer and colleagues, this shows that recognition is optimized when faces are 
categorized according to those visual markers that are widely thought to indicate race and sex. 
Given that the model was not explicitly trained to categorize faces according to race and sex, 
they go even further, suggesting that an understanding of the social significance of these 
categories “may be largely irrelevant to acquiring the ability to classify faces along these lines” 
(2017, 11).3   
The recognition-byproduct hypothesis also explains “race-contingent aftereffects.” 
Adaptational aftereffects occur when the firing rate of a sensory neuron begins to drop amidst 
prolonged exposure to its “preferred” stimulus. This reduction in firing rate has the dual effect of 
decreasing the neuron’s sensitivity to the adapted stimulus, while increasing its sensitivity to 
 
2 Kramer and colleagues’ (2017) use of the term “accurately” needs to be qualified, for if racial 
categories are not real, there is nothing for the model to be accurate about. Rather than presupposing 
realism, we can interpret Kramer and colleagues’ statement as follows: the model’s categorization of an 
individual as Black was “accurate” only if that individual would be considered Black by the folk; and the 
model’s categorization of an individual as White was “accurate” only if that individual would be 
considered White by the folk. This interpretation fits with Kramer and colleagues’ methodology, for the 
faces they fed into the model were found on Google Images, with search terms, such as “Black women,” 
and “White men.”  
3 Below, in section 2.3, I defend a somewhat weaker claim.  
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novel stimuli. For example, if you visually adapt to lines that are tilted slightly to the left of the 
vertical axis, and then view some vertical lines immediately afterwards, the latter will look as 
though they are tilted slightly to the right. Given that there is scant evidence for adaptational 
aftereffects in paradigmatically post-perceptual systems, their presence is widely seen as 
indicating that the process in question is perceptual (see Block, 2014).         
To test whether racial categorization produces adaptational aftereffects, Jaquet and colleagues 
(2007) presented participants with the faces of White European individuals, as well as the faces 
of individuals who are Chinese by descent. Importantly, the faces were all distorted: some were 
expanded, while others were contracted. During the adaptation phase, participants spent two 
minutes observing six of these faces, three of which were Chinese and three of which were 
White. In half of the trials, the Chinese faces were expanded by 60%, while the White faces were 
contracted by 60%. In the other trials, this pattern was inversed.       
Next, in the postadaptation rating phase, participants observed two versions of the same face, 
side by side on the screen: one version was contracted by 10%, while the other was expanded by 
10%. Low-level aftereffects are unlikely to transfer across images that differ significantly in size 
(Zhao & Chubb, 2001). Thus, to ensure that aftereffects were driven by high level face-
processing mechanisms, face-size was significantly varied between the adaptation phase and the 
postadaptation rating phase.   
Having observed the test faces for 2 s, participants were asked to indicate which one looked 
more “normal.” What Jaquet and colleagues found was that if the Chinese faces presented during 
the adaptation phase were expanded then the participant was more likely to rate the expanded 
test face as normal-looking, but only if it was Chinese. The analogous result was found for White 
faces. By the same token, if the Chinese faces presented during the adaptation phase were 
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contracted then the participant was more likely to rate the contracted test face as normal-
looking, but only if it was Chinese. Again, the analogous result was found for White faces (for 
replications, see Jaquet et al., 2008; Little et al., 2008; and Rhodes et al., 2010). 
According to Jaquet and colleagues (2007), race-contingent aftereffects provide evidence for 
two main hypotheses. First, faces belonging to different-race individuals are processed by 
distinct (even if overlapping) neural populations. Second, these distinct populations realize 
distinct face-spaces, the origin of each one containing the average face for the given racial 
category (Jaquet et al., 2008, 748-51; see also Jaquet et al., 2007; Rhodes et al., 2010). When 
trying to recognize a face, racial markers activate one of these face-spaces. The face in question 
is then compared to the face at the origin of this particular space. As Jaquet and colleagues point 
out (2008, p. 739), if we only possessed a single face-space with a single face at the origin, the 
aftereffects described above would not have occurred. Instead, the contracted and expanded faces 
that appeared during the adaptation phase would have cancelled one another out.      
Given that sex-contingent aftereffects have been uncovered as well (Little et al., 2005), 
various theorists have claimed that distinct (even if overlapping) populations of neurons realize 
sex-specific face-spaces (Baudouin & Gallay, 2006; Jaquet et al., 2008, 738; Little et al., 2005).    
The recognition-byproduct hypothesis explains why those visible features that are thought to 
indicate race and sex activate distinct face-spaces, thereby giving rise to the contingent 
aftereffects described above. These visible features are invariant cues for face recognition. Thus, 
to optimize recognition, face-spaces are constructed and updated in a way that exploits these 
cues. The end result is that individuals are categorized according to the visual markers of race 
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and sex early on within perception, thereby generating the pattern of aftereffects described 
above.4   
2.3 The delimited role of face recognition  
The recognition-byproduct hypothesis faces three main challenges. The first challenge concerns 
Hirschfeld’s view that young children’s representations of race are based primarily on verbal, not 
visual, cues (1993; 1996, pp. 155–157). Hirschfeld bases his claim on a simple experiment with 
3- and 4-year-old children (1993). In the first phase of the experiment, the children were told a 
story about a child who was seeking the help of four different adults. Each adult was described in 
terms of race, occupation, and a non-racial feature, such as age or body type. Immediately 
afterwards, the children were given a free recall test, the results of which demonstrated that they 
had successfully encoded all three categories.     
In another phase of the experiment, the children were shown drawings that depicted a similar 
story. The children were then given two tasks: to describe the events that occurred in the story; 
and to perform a memory test. Hirschfeld found that in both cases, children rarely mentioned 
race. This is in contrast to the first phase of the experiment, in which children successfully 
recalled information about the race of each adult. On the basis of these findings, Hirschfeld 
concludes that young children’s acquisition of racial concepts are guided by linguistic cues in a 
top-down manner (1993; 1996, pp. 155–157). 
 While important, Hirschfeld’s findings are compatible with the recognition-byproduct 
hypothesis. First, it is important to recognize that children do sort people according to skin color, 
 
4 I have been focusing on face recognition, but it is worth pointing out that in recognizing others, 
people utilize non-facial bodily cues as well (e.g., see Rice et al., 2013). This is compatible with the 
recognition-byproduct hypothesis.  
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even in the absence of verbal cues. For example, Shutts and colleagues (2013) found that 4-year-
olds use racial markers to predict who will be friends with whom. Importantly, these children 
were not primed with racial terms. In fact, in one of Hirschfeld’s own studies—which I discuss 
below—children as young as 3 years of age used skin color to make stereotype-consistent 
predictions of behavior (Hirschfeld et al., 2007). Thus, to claim that young children do not notice 
differences in skin color, and that they do not believe that skin color is diagnostic of race, would 
be misleading—a point that Hirschfeld acknowledges (1996, p. 155).  
Second, face recognition abilities are still developing in early childhood (see Hills & Lewis, 
2018; McKone et al., 2009). Dunham and colleagues (2014) found that while adults’ racial 
categorizations are sensitive to both skin color and other physiognomic cues, children rely much 
more heavily on skin color. They draw the conclusion that “children begin with a skin color 
heuristic and only gradually develop an appreciation of other category-diagnostic features” 
(2014, p. 479; see also Balas et al., 2015). As Dunham and colleagues note (2014, p. 480) this is 
to be expected, for it is widely recognized that as their ability to recognize faces improves, 
children gradually increase their reliance on configural cues (Freire & Lee, 2001; Mondloch et 
al., 2002).     
Overall, then, the evidence suggests that “race-specific” face-spaces take time to develop. As 
their recognition abilities improve, children’s sensitivity to the physiognomic markers of race 
improve as well. This enhances their tendency to see some individuals as more typical-looking 
for a given racial group than others, which, in turn, enhances their tendency towards certain 
forms of racial stereotyping and prejudice (Maddox, 2004; Maddox & Perry, 2018). Thus, what 
emerges is the belief that people can be divided up into socially meaningful categories, based on 
skin color, and other aspects of facial physiognomy.     
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To be clear, I’m not claiming that the mechanisms responsible for face recognition are solely 
responsible for the emergence of this belief: other factors, including linguistic cues, have an 
important role to play (see section 3). Rather, the claim is that this belief is produced and 
sustained, in part, by the mechanisms responsible for face recognition.  
 The second challenge concerns the claim, widely held by race scholars, that racial 
categorization is a uniquely modern phenomenon (for a useful overview, see Hochman, 2019).5 
Face recognition is a phylogenetically ancient capacity, but we don’t see clear and abundant 
examples of racial categorization in ancient texts. Does this undermine the recognition-byproduct 
hypothesis?     
Clearly, this depends on how we state the hypothesis. According to the strong version, the 
mechanisms responsible for face recognition produce representations of race as a byproduct. 
This seems to be what Kramer and colleagues are committing themselves to when they suggest 
that understanding the social significance of race “may be largely irrelevant to acquiring the 
ability to classify faces along these lines” (2017, p. 11).   
 If bona fide racial categorization did not occur before the modern (or late medieval) era, this 
suggests that the strong version of the recognition-byproduct hypothesis is false. However, 
consider a weaker version according to which the mechanisms responsible for face recognition 
do not produce bona fide representations of racial categories: rather, they sort people according 
to the visual markers of race, and thereby predispose us towards acquiring the belief that visible 
features are diagnostic of race. On this version of the hypothesis, for bona fide racial 
 
5 According to convention, the modern era began with the arrival of Columbus in “The New World,” 
in 1492. Hochman (2019) argues that the concept of race actually emerged in late medieval Spain, just 
before the start of the modern era. Obviously, this is still well after our capacity for face recognition first 
emerged. 
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categorization to occur, additional factors need to be in place; but once they are in place, face 
recognition plays a significant role in sustaining the belief that visible features are diagnostic of 
race.  
The third challenge concerns ordinary racial distinctions that are not based on visible 
differences. Hirschfeld points to several potential examples, such as English discourse about the 
Irish; characterizations of Italians as non-White in the early twentieth century; and the distinction 
between Northern Europeans of Protestant descent and Irish and Southern Europeans of Catholic 
descent (1996, pp. 43–44).   
Some philosophers have argued that according to the folk concept of race, racial differences 
are always marked in terms of visible features (see Glasgow, 2009, Chapter 2; Hardimon, 2002). 
I won’t take a stance on this issue, for even if we concede that the folk sometimes draw racial 
distinctions in the absence of distinguishing bodily features, the point remains that the belief that 
racial distinctions are visually marked is widespread, and the recognition-byproduct hypothesis 
provides one explanation of why this is the case.  
3 Misfiring modules and biological conceptions of race  
Up until this point, I have been focusing on the belief that bodily features are diagnostic of race. 
Another belief that tends to occupy ordinary thinking is the belief that these features are 
indicative of hidden traits: traits which are shared by all and only members of the given racial 
group. Various studies have found that the folk tend to construe these hidden traits as inherited 
(Hirschfeld, 1993, 1996; Gil-White, 2001, Machery & Faucher, 2020). Where does this 
biological thinking about race come from?    
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3.1 Atran’s account       
Some theorists have claimed that biological thinking about race is the byproduct of a module. 
According to Atran (2001), we possess a “living-kind module”: a psychological adaptation for 
distinguishing between species. Atran claims that racial markers, such as skin color, “readily 
meet minimum perceptual triggering conditions for firing the living-kind module” (2001, 538). 
In misfiring, the module thereby causes us to perceive the bearers of different racial markers as 
belonging to different species. Atran does not provide any direct evidence for this hypothesis; 
however, in a series of studies, he has provided evidence for his hypothesized living-kind module 
(Atran, 1990; Atran & Medin, 2010).    
There are various problems with the claim that biological thinking about race is the byproduct 
of a living-kind module. From as early as 3 months of age, infants do appear to distinguish 
between various species (Quinn & Eimas, 1997). By 5 years of age, they think that visually 
similar animals belong to the same natural kind, and that these kinds have strict boundaries 
(Rhodes, 2012; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Rhodes et al., 2014). In contrast, young children 
appear to see membership in racial groups as considerably more flexible (Rhodes et al., 2014). 
Moreover, unlike animal categories, children are much more likely to treat racial categories as 
having inductive value when they are exposed to certain linguistic cues.  
For example, Waxman (2010) showed 4-year-old children a picture of a person (e.g. a black 
woman), before telling them that this person possessed some trait, such as being good at a game 
called “zaggit.” Waxman found that unless the pictured individual was introduced as a member 
of a named category (e.g. “This one is a Wayshan”), children did not project the trait in question 
onto other members of the same racialized group. This squares away with other studies 
demonstrating that children are more likely to form essentialist beliefs about a social category 
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when attention is drawn to the category through the use of a generic statement, such as 
“Hispanics are X” or “African-Americans are Y” (Leslie, 2014; Rhodes et al., 2012). The 
important point is that without these linguistic cues, young children are not as likely to use racial 
categories as bases for inductive inferences.   
This is not the pattern of findings we would expect were racial categorizations the byproduct 
of a living-kind module. On the contrary, we would expect young children’s species 
categorizations to develop in lockstep with their racial categorizations. 
3.2 Hirschfeld’s account     
Hirschfeld agrees that the biological conception of race is the product of a module; however, he 
denies that this module is dedicated to detecting species. Instead, he argues that we possess a 
“human-kind module,” which tracks and essentializes those social groups that are salient within a 
given society (1996, 2001). Given that, in many societies, people with the same racial markers 
form relatively salient groups, the human-kind module uses these markers to track and 
essentialize them.     
Hirschfeld supports his account with studies of preschool-aged children. In one study, young 
children were shown a drawing of an adult and two children (Hirschfeld, 1993). Visual 
similarities between the adult and each child were varied along three dimensions: uniform, body 
build, and skin color. Some children were asked to say which child is the adult’s: others were 
asked to say which one was the adult as a child. In both conditions, children chose skin color 
over uniform and body build (at above chance levels).  
In another study, young children were told a story about a child who was born to parents of a 
given race, but was immediately adopted by parents of a different race (Hirschfeld, 1995). The 
children were asked to specify what the baby would look like when it was grown up (they did 
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this by pointing at depicted individuals). Four-year-olds reliably chose the individual with the 
same skin color as the birth parents. Hirschfeld’s findings have been replicated by studies 
conducted in various countries, such as Spain (Giménez & Harris, 2010) and Madagascar (Astuti 
et al., 2004). According to Hirschfeld, these studies provide converging evidence that 
preschoolers are essentialists about race: they see it as an immutable trait that is transmitted via 
descent (2001, pp. 114-115).  
Hirschfeld’s account faces a number of challenges. First, the cross-cultural robustness of a 
psychological phenomenon does not entail that it is generated by a domain-specific adaptation. 
Everybody believes that cars are a human invention, but this belief is clearly not the product of 
some domain-specific adaptation: the fact that cars are human-invented is easily acquired via 
domain-general learning (on this point, see Hochman, 2013, p. 999; Machery & Faucher, 2017, 
p. 1164).     
 To show that the biological conception of race is the byproduct of a domain-specific 
adaptation, we would need to establish that it is probably not the product of domain-general 
processes. For instance, suppose we were to acquire evidence that when infants perceive people 
with the same skin color, they expect them to behave in the same way. Furthermore, suppose 
infants have not had enough exposure to the visible markers of race for this capacity to have 
been acquired via domain-general processes. In that case, the evidence would be suggesting that 
a domain-specific adaptation processes racial categories as biological kinds. In other words, a 
“poverty of the stimulus argument” would be in the offing (see Chomsky, 1965).  
In Hirschfeld’s study, the youngest children were 3 years of age. We are therefore left with no 
reason to rule out domain-general processes. The fact that children inherit skin color from their 
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biological parents is an easily learnable fact: minimal exposure to different-race families would 
presumably suffice (see Hochman, 2013, p. 999; Machery & Faucher, 2017, p. 1164).  
 The second main problem concerns Hirschfeld’s claim that young children “essentialize” 
racial categories. While the studies outlined above provide evidence that young children see skin 
color as inherited and stable, they do not provide evidence that they see skin color as tied to a 
causally powerful “essence.” To assess the hypothesis that young children construe race in this 
way, Mandalaywala and colleagues (2019) tested children, aged 5 to 7 years, on a version of 
Hirschfeld’s switched-at-birth task. In addition to predicting the skin color of the grown-up 
adopted child, participants were asked to predict whether the child would possess the same 
psycho-behavioral dispositions as the birth parent, or, the adoptive parent. The experimenter did 
this by telling the participants that the baby is now 6 years of age, and has various characteristics, 
such as being smart and being good at sports. For each characteristic, the participant was asked 
whether the child possesses it because of the birth mother, or, because of the adoptive mother. 
Participants indicated that the target child would have the same skin color as the birth mother 
62% of the time. However, when the birth mother and the adoptive mother belonged to different 
racial groups, participants only said that the target child would share psycho-behavioral 
characteristics with the birth mother 31% of the time. Subsequent analyses confirmed that there 
was no effect of birth mother on predictions about psycho-behavioral characteristics. 
Mandalaywala and colleagues (2019) conclude that “by focusing on beliefs about the heritability 
of skin color, previous studies (e.g., Hirschfeld, 1995) overestimated the extent to which young 
children hold essentialist views of race” (2019, 447). They go on to say that although young 
children tend to see skin color as inherited, they expect a person’s psycho-behavioral dispositions 
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to be determined by the environment of upbringing, not their inherited race (see also Rhodes, 
2013a).     
There are studies suggesting that young children see racial categories as having inductive 
value. For example, in one of Hirschfeld’s studies, participants saw a drawing of two individuals: 
one had dark skin, and one had light skin (Hirschfeld et al., 2007). The participants were then 
asked to make predictions concerning the individuals’ characteristics. For example, in one trial, 
they were told, “One of them is a friendly girl.” They were then asked to indicate which one was 
it was. Hirschfeld and colleagues found that even 3-year-olds tended to give stereotype 
consistent answers. For example, they tended to predict that the individual with the light skin 
tone would be the friendly one (see also Williams & Roberson, 1967).   
However, despite the evidence of racial stereotyping in young children, there is still no 
evidence to suggest that a single module is responsible for both the tendency to essentialize race 
and the tendency to see race as inherited. As was just explained, in the only study of its kind, 
Mandalaywala and colleagues (2019) found that children’s belief that race is inherited did not 
predict essentialist beliefs about race. Moreover, neither children nor adults see membership in 
other salient groups, such as teachers or nations, as inherited (Gelman, 2003, p. 304; Machery & 
Faucher, 2017, pp. 1150–1151). However, children and adults do harbor a tendency to 
essentialize various non-racial groups—a point I elaborate on below. This further undermines the 
claim that a single module is responsible for both (i) the belief that race is inherited; and (ii) the 
tendency to essentialize racial groups.  
3.3 Mallon’s account  
Mallon defends an account that is similar to Hirschfeld’s. He draws a useful distinction between 
broad essentialism and lineage essentialism. To be a broad essentialist about a category, C, is to 
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accept the following two theses: (1) there are certain underlying natural properties the possession 
of which constitutes membership in C; and (2) possessing these underlying properties causally 
explains why certain other properties are typical for members of C (Mallon, 2016, pp. 25–26). 
To be a lineage essentialist about C is to accept (1) and (2), plus the following theses: (3) the 
offspring of members of C are also members of C; (4) genuine members of C only come from 
other genuine members of C (Mallon, 2016, p. 29).  
 Mallon argues that lineage essentialism about race emerges from a system that is innate, 
domain-specific, and species-typical. In gathering evidence for this claim, Mallon goes well 
beyond Hirschfeld’s findings. For example, he provides qualitative historical evidence for 
lineage essentialism outside the modern European-American context (2016, pp. 33–34). In 
examining the unique patterns of racial classification among both Brazilians and the Vezo of 
Madagascar, Mallon also provides a novel account of how inheritance thinking about race is 
moderated by local cultural conditions (2016, pp. 35–42).    
 Mallon thus clarifies and extends Hirschfeld’s thesis in important ways. However, in claiming 
that there is a unique system that is responsible for both broad essentialism about race, and 
inheritance thinking about race, he faces the problem that was raised above: namely, that even 
when young children exhibit inheritance thinking about race, this does not predict broad 
essentialist beliefs about race. In other words, the developmental evidence does not support the 
claim that the two components of lineage essentialism are produced by one and the same 
mechanism.      
3.4 Gil-White’s account  
Gil-White’s account faces the same problem. He argues that folk-biological mechanisms were 
exapted during the Pleistocene for the purposes of detecting members of other “ethnies”: cultural 
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groups made up of smaller units called “bands” (see Richerson & Boyd, 2005). As Gil-White 
(2001, pp. 518-519) points out, ethnies would have displayed some of the key markers of 
species. First, due to culturally transmitted norms, members of the same ethnie would have 
exhibited similar behaviors. Second, ethnies would have been largely endogamous. Finally, 
because members of the same ethnie would have shared the same type of clothing, bodily 
markings, and language, they would have looked and sounded similar.   
Given the similarities between species and ethnies, Gil-White claims that individuals who 
began to see members of other ethnies as members of other species would have enjoyed a boost 
in reproductive success. Why? Because differences in norms would have made attempts to 
coordinate with members of other ethnies costly (in terms of energy and time wasted). This 
plausibly led to the exaptation of Atran’s living-kind module, the result being that the detection 
of other ethnies became automatic and stimulus-driven (Gil-White, 2001, p. 519).   
Gil-White (2001, p. 534) goes on to suggest that in contemporary contexts, we automatically 
see members of other races as members of other ethnies, because racial markers, such as skin 
color, trigger the ethnie-detector (for similar approaches, see Machery & Faucher, 2005; Moya, 
2013; Moya & Boyd, 2015; Moya & Henrich, 2016).  
In marshalling support for his hypothesis, Gil-White (2001) appeals to a study of two 
seminomadic pastoralist groups in Mongolia: the Torguuds and the Kazakhs. According to Gil-
White’s findings, members of both groups believe that children inherit psycho-behavioral traits 
from their biological parents: traits that are seen as being essential to membership in the given 
ethnic group (2001, pp. 523-526).  
Gil-White’s account faces two main problems. First, infants do appear to use ethnic markers, 
such as language, as bases for inductive inferences about group membership. For example, 
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infants expect speakers of the same language to form affiliations, and to share food preferences 
(see Liberman et al., 2017). However, infants do not expect individuals with the same racial 
markers to form affiliations. It is not until about 4 years of age that children draw these sorts of 
inferences (Shutts et al., 2013). In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that infants engage in 
racial categorization, let alone see racial groups as ethnie-like.  
The second problem concerns Gil-White’s claim that the ethnie-detector produces both the 
belief that race is inherited, and the belief that members of the same racial group share psycho-
behavioral traits. Once again, the developmental evidence suggest that these beliefs are not 
produced by one and the same mechanism. I have already pointed out that, for all we know, 
children acquire the former belief via domain-general processes. In what follows, I focus on the 
mechanisms responsible for the latter belief.   
4 Entitativity perception and essentialist beliefs about race 
One of the core findings in social psychology is that we tend to essentialize and dehumanize the 
members of outgroups. Racial outgroups are no exception. In what follows, I elaborate on this 
line of reasoning by focusing on the mechanisms responsible for “entitativity perception.”  
4.1 Two kinds of entitativity perception  
Social psychologists use the term “entitative” to denote the quality of being a group. For 
example, a street gang seems more entitative (or “groupy”) than an aggregate of people waiting 
in line at a coffee shop. Research suggests that there are two kinds of entitativity perception: 
categorical entitativity perception and dynamical entitativity perception (Ip et al., 2006; 
Rutchick et al., 2008). Groups whose members are perceived as highly similar are perceived as 
high in categorical entitativity; whereas, groups whose members are perceived as engaging in 
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acts of affiliation and coordinated action (i.e. coalitional groups) are perceived as high in 
dynamical entitativity.   
Empirical support for the distinction comes from studies in which participants are primed to 
think about the unity of a group in different ways. For instance, Rutchick and colleagues (2008) 
asked participants to think about a group of bees. In the categorical condition, they were shown a 
taxonomic chart, and were asked to think about each bee as a member of the same biological 
category. In the dynamic condition, they were shown diagrams outlining the different roles that 
drones, workers, and queens play in a functioning beehive. Participants were then asked to rate 
the entitativity of various groups, including a Bhutanese social caste; a political party; and a 
group of students. They were also asked to list the three most important things about each group.   
The categorical prime caused participants to focus on the degree of similarity between group 
members, which drove their impression of entitativity. The dynamic prime caused them to focus 
on the degree of interaction among group members, which drove their impression of entitativity 
(see also Haslam et al., 2000; Ip et al., 2006; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007).   
Other studies have found that entitativity perception—in both its forms—is a key precursor to 
stereotyping (e.g., see Crawford et al., 2002; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007). Given that 
dynamical entitativity perception involves the detection of coalitional groups, the stereotypes that 
it fuels tend to be about group goals and achievements (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007). In 
contrast, categorical entitativity perception involves the detection of groups whose members are 
highly similar (they need not be affiliated with one another). For this reason, it tends to drive 
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broad essentialism (Haslam et al., 2000; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007; 
Yzerbyt et al., 1997).6    
4.2 The role of categorical entitativity perception  
There are good reasons for thinking that racial essentialism is driven, in large part, by categorical 
entitativity perception. As was explained above, for people raised in primarily monoracial 
settings, the members of racial outgroups tend to look more similar to one another than the 
members of their racial ingroup. We also examined the evidence for “race-specific” face-spaces. 
These face-spaces enhance the impression that members of the same racial group are physically 
similar, for same-race faces tend to cluster around the typical face for that group.     
Given that the members of racial outgroups tend to be seen as physically similar, it is a short 
step to categorical entitativity perception, and thus essentialist thinking about race. To test this 
hypothesis, Dasgupta and colleagues (1999) told participants about two groups of humanoid 
creatures: “Gs” and “Hs.” Participants were then presented with a series of pictures in which Gs, 
but not Hs, were present. In some trials, all Gs had the same skin color, while in other trials, their 
skin color varied. After each trial, participants answered questions about the psychological traits 
of Gs. Dasgupta and colleagues found that participants were more likely to attribute common 
psychological traits to Gs when they had the same skin color (for a similar finding, see Ip et al., 
2009).  
This, and other studies like it, focus on bodily indicators of race, but entitativity perception 
can be driven by perceived similarities in behavior too (e.g., see Crawford et al., 2002; Fessler & 
Holbrook, 2016). For example, in Crawford and colleagues’ seminal study, participants read 
 
6 In what follows, I use the term “essentialism” to denote broad essentialism (as defined above in 
section 3.3).  
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about high and low entitativity groups. Members of the high entitativity group were described as 
having similar backgrounds, beliefs, and personalities: they were also described as acting in a 
similar manner “across a variety of situations” (2002, p. 1080). In fact, physical features were 
not mentioned at all. Nonetheless, Crawford and colleagues found that describing a group as 
such caused participants to project the observed traits of one member onto others in the group.  
This provides us with one explanation of why racial distinctions are sometimes drawn in the 
absence of distinguishing bodily features: it is because the groups in question are perceived as 
psychologically and behaviorally homogenous. For example, given the cultural norms and 
practices shared by Italian-Americans in the early twentieth century, those who racialized them 
may have done so, in part, because they perceived them as psychologically homogenous, and 
thus, categorically entitative.7   
4.2.1 Explaining variation in essentialist thinking  
In developing the view that essentialist thinking about race is driven by categorical entitativity 
perception, an immediate challenge is worth considering: namely, why do a significant 
proportion of people disavow essentialist claims about race?   
Some studies have found that people tend to see racial categories as high in categorical 
entitativity (e.g. see Haslam et al., 2000). However, other studies suggest that folk beliefs vary to 
a significant degree. For instance, Shulman and Glasgow (2010) found that 25% of US adults do 
not believe that race is real. And among the 75% who said that race is real, a significant 
 
7 No doubt, various other factors have a role to play in explaining this sort of case. For example, 
knowing that Italian-Americans immigrated from the same geographical region may have caused some to 
construe them as sharing an inherited essence. Moreover, there is evidence that people with a “social 
dominance orientation”—i.e. a general preference for social inequality—tend to biologize and 
dehumanize social outgroups (Costello & Hodson, 2010).   
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proportion rejected the view that races are natural kinds. For example, 21% of realists regarded 
races as purely social categories, while 25% regarded races as hybrid biosocial categories (see 
also Condit et al., 2004; Dubriwny et al., 2004). How do we explain this sort of variation?  
The first thing to note about the studies mentioned above is that they surveyed participants on 
their explicit, self-reported, beliefs about race. Various studies have found that when it comes to 
implicit attitudes about race (and other social categories), people tend to be more essentialist in 
their thinking (e.g., see Chas et al., 2018; Goff et al., 2008; Karasawa et al., 2019).  
The second thing to note is that various factors modulate the way in which similarity cues are 
consumed by the mechanisms responsible for categorical entitativity perception. For instance, in 
a study by Ip and colleagues (2009), participants watched animations depicting humanoid 
creatures called “Volotos.” In some trials, each creature had the same skin color, while in the 
others, skin color varied. Moreover, in some trials, the creatures moved in synchrony, while in 
others, they stood still. Finally, in some trials, a second group of creatures was located nearby. 
Immediately after observing each animation, participants were asked to rate the target group’s 
degree of entitativity. They were also asked to specify the degree to which group members 
shared common psychological traits, as well as the degree to which they shared common goals.   
What Ip and colleagues found is that when skin color varied, but group members moved in 
synchrony, this led to the attribution of common goals. In contrast, when skin color was uniform, 
this led to the attribution of common psychological traits, but only if a second group of creatures, 
with different skin colors, was present. Ip and colleagues conclude that inferring common 
psychological traits from common physical traits is constrained by what Turner (1987) calls “the 
principle of metacontrast.” According to this principle, perceivers are more likely to process an 
aggregate of people as entitative when they detect low intragroup variability and high intergroup 
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variability with respect to some salient feature. Thus, for skin color to be seen as diagnostic of 
group membership, it must be seen as varying to a significant degree between, but not within, 
groups.    
This provides us with another way to explain variation in essentialist thinking about race. 
Consider an individual who lives in a city, the neighborhoods of which are segregated according 
to race, versus an individual who lives in a more racially integrated setting. The first individual is 
more likely to see racial markers as diagnostic of group membership than the second one. The 
first individual is therefore more likely to perceive racial groups as high in categorical 
entitativity.   
 This hypothesis is supported by a number of studies, which have found that living in a racially 
homogenous setting predicts essentialist thinking about race. For instance, Pauker and colleagues 
(2018) performed a longitudinal study of people who moved from continental United States to 
Hawaii: the most racially diverse area in the United States. Utilizing the Race Conceptions Scale 
(Williams & Eberhardt, 2008), they found that essentialist beliefs about race decreased over 
time. More specifically, they found that those who showed the greatest decrease in essentialist 
thinking had the greatest increase in diversity of acquaintances (for similar findings, see Deeb et 
al., 2011; Mandalaywala et al., 2019; Pauker et al., 2016).   
 Other lines of research suggest that an individual’s immediate social environment affects the 
degree to which perceptual mechanisms process racial markers as entitativity cues. For example, 
Phillips and colleagues (2018) tested the hypothesis that group impressions are extracted via 
ensemble-coding mechanisms: perceptual mechanisms which extract the central tendency of a 
group of objects in a rapid, and parallel, manner. In each trial, participants were shown two 
successive sets of faces. In one study, they were asked to specify which group was more racially 
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diverse. In another study, they were asked to specify which group was more diverse in terms of 
gender. In a third study, they were tasked with specifying which group was more hierarchical. 
Importantly, each image was presented for 200 ms, before being backwards masked. The brief 
presentation time was designed to prevent serial processing (saccades take longer than 200 ms). 
Participants were above chance at detecting the more racially diverse group, as well as the more 
hierarchical group.  
 For our purposes, this sort of finding is important because it suggests that a crowds’ degree of 
physical homogeneity is calculated by a stimulus-driven mechanism. This therefore provides us 
with another explanation of why racial essentialism is enhanced in racially segregated settings. It 
is because this mechanism is being exposed to crowds that exhibit relatively low variation in 
racial markers, the result of which is categorical entitativity perception and thus a tendency 
towards essentialist thinking.  
Other studies provide additional support for the hypothesis that categorical entitativity 
perception is driven, in part, by ensemble-coding mechanisms. Lamer and colleagues (2018) 
showed images of racially diverse crowds to participants (half of the individuals depicted were 
Black; the other half were White). Each image was presented for 300 ms. For participants in the 
emotional segregation condition, there was a large difference in the average emotional 
expression across Black and White subgroups; whereas, for participants in the control condition, 
the difference was small. Participants were then given two tasks. In the race categorization task, 
they had to identify a racially ambiguous face as “Black,” “White,” or “Biracial.” The purpose of 
this task was to assess the extent to which participants draw strict boundaries between racial 
groups. In the race essentialism task, the Race Conceptions Scale was used to assess participants’ 
degree of racial essentialism.  
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Lamer and colleagues found that the participants in the emotional segregation condition saw 
the boundaries between racial categories as stricter than those in the control condition did. 
Participants in the emotional segregation condition were also more essentialist in their thinking 
about race. By including a condition in which participants only saw a single face, rather than a 
crowd, Lamer and colleagues were also able to show that these effects were mediated by 
ensemble coding. This supports the hypothesis that when racially homogenous crowds are 
visually salient, ensemble coding is triggered. This results in categorical entitativity perception, 
and thus, essentialist thinking about race (see also Enos & Celaya, 2018).     
4.2.2 The etiology of categorical entitativity perception   
While the studies outlined above suggest that racial essentialism is driven by the mechanisms 
responsible for categorical entitativity perception, they do not directly address the origins of 
these mechanisms. It is possible that categorical entitativity perception arises from a domain-
general tendency to essentialize categories: one that manifests itself differently across social and 
non-social domains (for a relevant discussion, see Gelman, 2003, Chapter 11). Alternatively, it is 
possible that there is a domain-specific mechanism that was adapted for essentializing human 
groups on the basis of perceived similarities between members.     
 The fact that categorical entitativity perception is driven by low-level ensemble-coding 
mechanisms provides initial support for the latter view. In fact, in interpreting their findings, 
Lamer and colleagues (2018) suggest that although ensemble-coding mechanisms evolved for 
the purposes of processing arrays of non-social features, such as shapes and colors, they may 
have been exapted for the purposes of detecting social groups as well.     
While plausible enough, additional data is needed to assess this sort of hypothesis. At present, 
research into “people perception”—the tendency to form rapid, stimulus-driven, impressions of 
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crowds—is still in its infancy (for an overview, see Phillips et al., 2014). By further examining 
the developmental and cross-cultural profile of ensemble-coding mechanisms, we stand to gain a 
much better understanding of the origins of categorical entitativity perception, and thereby racial 
essentialism.8     
4.3 The role of dynamical entitativity perception  
I have just argued that categorical entitativity perception drives essentialist thinking about race. 
What role, if any, does dynamical entitativity perception play in driving ordinary thinking about 
race?   
Some evolutionary psychologists argue that we possess an “alliance-detection system,” which 
was adapted for tracking alliances (Cosmides et al., 2003; Kurzban et al., 2001; Pietraszewski et 
al., 2014, 2015; see also Hirschfeld, 2001, p. 113). Given that alliances are dynamically 
entitative groups, another way to state this view is that the alliance-detection-system tracks 
groups that are high in dynamical entitativity. If societal conditions are such that racial markers 
 
8 The account I have just defended is compatible with the view that racial categorization is a modern 
phenomenon. Plausibly, before the modern concept of race emerged, the most salient social groups cut 
across racial lines. For instance, Ivan Hannaford argues persuasively that before the Renaissance and the 
Reformation, “one’s identity and social status were determined by one’s political and religious 
commitments, not the color of one’s skin” (1996, pp. 147-148). Once racial markers became salient cues 
for group membership, this would have engaged the mechanisms responsible for categorical entitativity 
perception, thereby fueling the acquisition of distinctively modern, essentialist conceptions, of race. What 
might have caused racial markers to become salient, though? A large body of research has found that 
people tend to form social networks with those who are similar to them. Psychologists refer to this as 
homophily (for an overview, see McPherson et al., 2001). There has been little research into how people 
weigh the different dimensions of similarity (e.g. race versus age) when forming social networks. 
Plausibly, if one’s social standing is largely determined by one’s religious and political beliefs, the visible 
markers of race will not be especially salient. However, in a society in which these beliefs are less 
powerful drivers of social standing, racial markers may be salient enough to shape the emergence of 
homophilous social networks. The emergence of these racially skewed networks will, in turn, increase the 
salience of racial markers. Of course, there is a lot more to be said about the historical and psychological 
factors that drive racial segregation. Suffice it to say that additional research into the multidimensional 
nature of homophily may provide important insights.   
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are a reliable indicator of who is allied with whom then, according to these theorists, the alliance-
detection-system picks up on this, and represents bearers of the same markers as allies.  
Evidence for the theory comes from a series of studies based on the “Who Said What?” 
paradigm. Subjects are shown a series of pictures, each one depicting a person issuing a different 
statement. Then, in the second phase of the study, subjects are given a surprise memory test, in 
which they are asked to recall who said what. The pattern of mistakes that subjects make is 
interpreted as revealing the categories they automatically represent. The assumption here is that 
if S automatically categorizes A and B in the same way (e.g. as women) then that raises the 
likelihood that S will attribute a statement to A, when it was actually B who made the statement. 
This is referred to as a “within-category error.” “Between-category errors” occur when the 
subject confuses members of distinct categories. As it turns out, subjects tend to make 
significantly more within-category errors than between-category ones.   
 Initial studies found that the most persistent and widespread within-category errors concern 
sex, race, and age. However, in a series of more recent studies, proponents of the alliance-
detection theory have shown that when alliances cut across racial lines, within-category errors 
for race decrease significantly, and are replaced by within-category errors for the relevant 
alliance-category (Kurzban et al., 2001; Pietraszewski et al., 2014, 2015). Pietraszewski and 
colleagues (2014) conclude that “categorizing people by their race is a reversible product of a 





4.3.1 Do the folk really see racialized groups as alliances? 
In responding to the alliance-detection account, some theorists have suggested that racialized 
groups do not have the hallmarks of alliances (see Glasgow, 2009, pp. 68–69; Machery & 
Faucher, 2017, pp. 1157–1158). Unfortunately, this is an understudied issue. 
Lickel and colleagues (2000) asked participants to rate various groups in terms of their degree 
of entitativity; degree of interaction among group members; and degree to which group members 
have common goals and outcomes. The only racial group that participants were asked about were 
“Blacks.” This group was rated as relatively low in entitativity (2000, p. 227). Moreover, unlike 
families and other paradigmatically coalitional groups, this racial group was not seen as 
possessing the hallmarks of a dynamically entitative group. For example, its members were only 
rated as sharing common goals and outcomes to a relatively small degree (2000, p. 231). It might 
be tempting to conclude that the folk do not see racial groups as alliances; however, to draw that 
conclusion, different sorts of studies would be required.   
 First, it may be that the folk implicitly process racial groups as high in dynamical entitativity: 
in Lickel and colleagues’ study, only explicit measures were utilized. A number of studies have 
found that groups are automatically represented as dynamically entitative when certain cues are 
visible, such as synchronous movement (Bloom & Veres, 1999; Fawcett & Tunçgenç, 2017; 
Fessler & Holbrook, 2016). In racially segregated settings, these sorts of cues might cause people 
to implicitly process racial groups as dynamically entitative. For example, frequently seeing 
members of the same racial group walk together, talk together, and engage in joint attention, 
might trigger the mechanisms in question.  
 Second, as the study by Rutchick and colleagues (2008) shows, individuals can be primed to 
think of the same group in different ways: namely, as categorically entitative or as dynamically 
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entitative. It may be that in some contexts, racial groups are thought of as dynamically entitative, 
whereas, in others they are not (on this point, see Phillips, 2020).   
 In one of the only studies of its kind, Pietraszewski (2016) utilized a version of the Who said 
what? paradigm to assess how racially charged primes would affect participants’ performance. 
Participants saw a series of photographs: half depicted White individuals, while the other half 
depicted Black individuals. Some of the individuals made statements indicating that they work 
for the same charity (i.e. a dynamically entitative group). Importantly, some of the individuals in 
the charity group were Black, while others were White. Before being asked to recall who said 
what, participants completed a distractor task. In the prime condition, participants were asked to 
think about racial conflict and inequality: they also viewed photographs depicting racial conflict. 
The purpose of this prime was to make participants think about the “coalitional relevance” of 
race (2016, 87). In the nonprime condition, participants were asked to name US state capitals.  
 Pietraszewski (2016) found that in the nonprime condition, participants tended to confuse 
members of the charity group. However, in the prime condition, they tended to confuse members 
of the same racial group. According to Pietraszewski, participants confused members of the same 
racial group in the prime condition because they were construing them as members of the same 
alliance; whereas, in the nonprime condition, participants only confused members of the same 
charity group, because this was the only salient alliance.  
 Pietraszewski’s study provides some evidence that people can be primed to think of racial 
groups as alliances (i.e. as high in dynamically entitativity). The study by Rutchick and 
colleagues (2008) also provides some indirect evidence. Recall that one of the target groups was 
a Bhutanese social caste. Exposure to the dynamical prime—a description of a functioning 
beehive—enhanced participants’ impression that this caste is a dynamically entitative group. 
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Given the close resemblance between social castes and racial groups, it would not be surprising 
to find that certain primes can cause people to think of racial groups as dynamically entitative as 
well.9  
4.3.2 The etiology of dynamical entitativity perception     
What is the origin of dynamical entitativity perception? As was explained above, Cosmides and 
colleagues argue that we possess a mechanism that was adapted for tracking alliances. In 
addition to the evidence they adduce, a number of studies suggest that children regard coalitional 
groups as an important type of social category (for an overview, see Rhodes, 2013a). For 
instance, Kalish and Lawson (2008) found that young children consistently regard the members 
of novel social categories (introduced via novel labels) as having obligations to one another (for 
similar findings, see Rhodes, 2012).    
 In fact, there is evidence that infants engage in dynamical entitativity perception. Fawcett and 
Tunçgenç (2017) found that 15-month-olds use synchronous movement to predict who is 
affiliated with whom. By measuring looking times, Powell and Spelke (2018) found that infants 
as young as 4 months of age expect agents to form affiliations with those whose movements they 
imitate.    
 Thus, the developmental evidence supports the hypothesis that we possess mechanisms that 
were adapted for tracking alliances. However, to assess the hypothesis that ordinary racial 
thinking is driven, to a significant extent, by these mechanisms, more cross-cultural and 
developmental studies are needed. One developmental study found that preschool-age children 
use the visible markers of race to predict allegiances (Shutts et al., 2013). In extending this 
finding, future studies should present both children and adults with a wide variety of dynamical 
 
9 See Wilkerson (2020) for a discussion of the resemblances between social castes and racial groups.  
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entitativity cues, such as video footage of same-race individuals walking together, and engaging 
in other forms of affiliative activity. If, on the basis of these cues, participants tend to represent 
members of the given racial group as allies, this will constitute evidence that dynamical 
entitativity perception has a significant role to play in explaining the origins of racial thinking.    
5 Conclusion    
I have defended a pluralistic thesis according to which different ways of thinking about race are 
driven by distinct mechanisms. I began by arguing that the mechanisms responsible for face 
recognition have an important, albeit delimited, role to play in sustaining the belief that visible 
features are diagnostic of race. I then argued that essentialist beliefs about race are driven, in 
large part, by some of the mechanisms responsible for entitativity perception. In elaborating on 
the role that these mechanisms play, I distinguished between two varieties of entitativity 
perception: categorical and dynamical.   
Categorical entitativity perception drives broad essentialist thinking about race. Moreover, the 
evidence reviewed above suggests that this form of entitativity perception is subserved by low-
level ensemble-coding mechanisms. It is possible that these mechanisms were exapted for the 
purposes of detecting social groups. Assessing this sort of hypothesis will require more research 
into the developmental, and cross-cultural, profile of these mechanisms.      
In examining the role of dynamical entitativity perception, I argued that there are good 
reasons for thinking that it drives the tendency to think of racial groups as coalitions. The 
evidence reviewed above suggests that this variety of entitativity perception is subserved by 
early-developing mechanisms, which are tuned to low-level cues, such as synchronous 
movement. This supports the hypothesis that coalitional thinking about race is produced by 
mechanisms that were adapted for tracking coalitions. However, if we are to determine the 
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prevalence of coalitional thinking about race, more developmental and cross-cultural studies are 
needed.     
 Interestingly, two studies found that dynamical entitativity perception is the predominant 
mode of group perception among Japanese individuals; whereas, categorical entitativity 
perception is the predominant mode among American individuals (Yuki, 2003; Kurebayashi et 
al., 2012). Additional studies of this sort may generate novel explanations of cross-cultural 
variation in racial categorization. For example, it is possible that Japanese individuals are more 
likely than American individuals to see racial groups as coalitional; whereas, American 
individuals are more likely than Japanese individuals to see members of the same racial group as 
sharing a fixed essence.     
In addition to explaining how and why we categorize people according to race, the pluralistic 
approach I have defended has implications for other issues surrounding the psychology of race. 
For example, there is evidence that the different forms of entitativity perception give rise to 
stereotypes with distinctive contents (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2007). Thus, studying the relation 
between entitativity perception and racial categorization may provide new insights into how 
racial stereotyping works (for further discussion, see Phillips, 2020).    
 Other studies have found that when people perceive an outgroup as dynamically entitative, 
they tend to hold each member responsible for the actions of the group. This can lead to acts of 
vicarious retribution in which a member of the outgroup is punished, even if they had nothing to 
do with the incident that provoked the punitive action (Lickel et al., 2006). Thus, by examining 
the relation between dynamical entitativity perception and racial categorization, researchers may 
gain new insights into those forms of racial prejudice that involve vicarious retribution (for a 
number of potential examples, see Smith, 2011).   
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Finally, the pluralistic account I have defended has consequences for debates about the ethics 
of racial categorization. According to eliminativists, we should eliminate racial categorization 
altogether. Conservationists, however, argue that instead of eliminating racial categorization, the 
best way to deal with racial inequality is to retain racial categorization, but to remove its most 
pernicious aspects, such as the belief that racial groups are biologically distinct (for an overview, 
see Kelly, Machery, & Mallon, 2010).  
I have argued that cues for categorical entitativity perception are highly salient when racial 
groups are segregated. Some of the cues for dynamical entitativity perception, such as 
synchronicity, are also highly salient when racial groups are segregated. This suggests that the 
prospects for eliminating racial categorization hang on the feasibility of eliminating racial 
segregation.   
Suppose, however, that removing biological thinking about race is the goal. According to the 
cognitive-evolutionary theories surveyed in section 3, when racial categorization occurs, this 
brings inheritance thinking in its train. If one of these theories is right then preserving racial 
categorization, while jettisoning biological thinking about race, may be especially difficult (on 
this point, see Kelly, Machery, & Mallon, 2010, pp. 449–450). In contrast, according to the 
pluralistic account I have defended, racial categorization does not necessarily bring inheritance 
thinking in its train. Most obviously, the mechanisms responsible for coalitional thinking about 
race do not produce inheritance thinking about race. As was mentioned above, though, there are 
reasons for thinking that seeing racial groups as coalitional engenders distinctive forms of racial 
prejudice and stereotyping. In pursuing a conservationist approach to racial categorization, these 
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